Designing rules for demand-driven rural investment funds :the latin american experience
By: Wiens, Thomas
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Contributor(s): Gaudagni, Maurizio.
Material type: 
BookSeries: Publisher: Washington D.C : World Bank Publications, 1998Description: 90 p.ISBN: 0821342290 (paperback); 9780821342299 (paperback).Subject(s): Social ScienceDDC classification: 307.1412098 Wiens 16018 1st 1998 Social.Science Summary: The demand-driven rural investment fund (DRIF) is a new mechanism for decentralizing decisionmaking authority and financial resources to local governments and communities to use for investments of their choice. To counteract the local government's weak capacity to choose and implement projects well, central governments have often constrained the choices of communities by limiting the types of projects eligible for financing and requiring specific procedures for procurement and disbursement. This study explores the extent to which well-designed DRIF rules and incentive structures can substitute for central control. It looks at the different and often conflicting motivations of donors, central governments, and communities and explores how rules can be devised to allow actors to achieve their objectives.
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UVAS Library Social Science | Social Science | 307.1412098 Wiens 16018 1st 1998 Social.Science (Browse shelf) | Available | 16018 |
The demand-driven rural investment fund (DRIF) is a new mechanism for decentralizing decisionmaking authority and financial resources to local governments and communities to use for investments of their choice. To counteract the local government's weak capacity to choose and implement projects well, central governments have often constrained the choices of communities by limiting the types of projects eligible for financing and requiring specific procedures for procurement and disbursement. This study explores the extent to which well-designed DRIF rules and incentive structures can substitute for central control. It looks at the different and often conflicting motivations of donors, central governments, and communities and explores how rules can be devised to allow actors to achieve their objectives.
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